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Many people, by now, are used to the idea that it makes sense to be uncertain about 
various necessary truths, even logical truths.  And not just that it makes sense as a 
psychological matter, but that it can be rational to be less than completely certain of 
some necessary truths, or rational to be less than completely certain of the falsehood 
of impossibilities.  Cases of the necessary a posteriori are like this:  it was rational for 
chemists in the early nineteenth century to be uncertain about the chemical 
composition of water, for example, even if it is necessary that water is H2O.  If I am 
uncertain of “The Blues will win the next chariot race” I should be equally uncertain 
of “Actually, the Blues will win the next chariot race” even though, given the 
technical use of “actually” popular among philosophers, the second sentence is 
necessary if true at all. 
 
Even apart from these sorts of cases, it seems very sensible to be less than completely 
confident of all necessary truths.  The standard view is that the identities in basic 
arithmetic are necessary (e.g. 78+113=191), but many rational people are not 
completely certain they have added up their restaurant bills correctly.  (If someone 
offers you a bet on a restaurant bill sum, giving you a dollar if you are right and 
taking everything you own if you are wrong, don’t take that bet.)  Even those who 
think that mathematical truths are contingent will typically believe there are logically 
true sentences that are about as uncertain as mathematical ones:  the claim that the 
first eight axioms of Peano arithmetic materially imply that 78+113=191, for example 
can be expressed in predicate logic.  This is even before we get to questions such as 
whether it is rational to be uncertain about whether classical logic or the axioms of 
classical probability:  if it is rational to be less than completely certain of our logic or 
probability theory, then this will be another sort of reason to have a credence of less 
than 1 in the theorems of logic and probability.  These sorts of considerations also 
show that contingent claims that are necessarily equivalent to each other should not 
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always receive the same credence.  One simple example:  "Obama is in Washington 
and water is H2O" is necessarily equivalent to "Obama is in Washington", but any 
reasonable uncertainty about "water is H2O" will make the first claim less credible 
than the second. 
 
Coping with this requires some modification of a standard interpretation of credences, 
on which they are measures over possibilities, or possible states, outcomes, or events.  
A conservative way to do this is to understand credence measures as measures over 
both possible and impossible worlds/states/outcomes/events.  Once we realise that 
people can believe impossibilities, and rationally do so, extending rational degrees of 
belief to impossibilities seems difficult to resist.  A natural consequence of extending 
probability theory in this way is to deny that necessarily equivalent claims always 
share the same credence for an agent:  an agent can be sure that water is water but 
unsure that water is H2O, sure that it is raining or not raining but unsure of 
78+113=191, or unsure whether it is actually raining, even though one of "actually it 
is raining" or "actually it is not raining" is a necessary truth. 
 
However, even those who are willing to accept that credences may vary between 
logically equivalent propositions may well think the case of objective chance is 
different.  What could it mean for necessarily equivalent propositions to have 
different chances?  Surely there is no chance that one could happen without the other?  
In addition, objective chance is often thought of as (objective) possibility coming in 
degrees.  Necessarily equivalent propositions cannot differ from each other with 
respect to whether they are possible, or necessary, so it can seem natural that they 
could not differ in what chances they receive either. 
 
A final motivation to think that necessary equivalents cannot differ in their chances is 
the thought that our motive for distinguishing necessary equivalents is only to handle 
issues about our representation of the world, not the world itself (e.g. that we may 
have distinct necessarily equivalent representations of the world because of our 
ignorance, not because we are tracking different states in the world itself).  I have 
argued elsewhere that this is a mistaken view (see Nolan 2014), but those tempted by 
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a view like this may well think that objective chance is about the world, not about 
how we represent it, and so should not be sensitive to any distinction between 
necessary equivalents. 
 
The view I will be arguing against in this paper is a principle about the substitution of 
necessary equivalents in chance statements.  In particular, the view I will be arguing 
against is the view that necessarily equivalent propositions always receive the same 
objective chance.  For those who prefer to think of chances as features of events rather 
than of propositions, the target will be the claim that events which necessarily co-
occur always receive the same chance.  To make the following discussion easier, let 
me label these views (where Chx() is a chance function relative to parameters x): 
 
SUB:  For any propositions P and Q, if P and Q strictly imply each other, then 
Chx(P)=Chx(Q) 
 
Or if we prefer to state chances as features of events rather than values of 
propositions,  
 
SUB(events):  For any events A and B such that necessarily, A occurs if and only if B 
occurs, then Chx(A)=Chx(B). 
 
Of course, even the same proposition bearing different chances would be unsurprising 
if there were more than one kind of genuine objective chance.  And if chances are 
relative to some parameter (times, chance setups, worlds, or whatever), again it would 
be no surprise if even one and the same proposition bore different chances relative to 
different times, different chance setups, different worlds, or whatever.  A fortiori, 
necessarily equivalent propositions could easily have different chances of different 
kinds, or different chances relative to different parameters   However, these types of 
variation are not my concern here.  Keep the kind of objective chance fixed, and the 
parameters, if any, fixed.  With the same choices made for kind and parameter, can 
necessarily equivalent propositions differ in their chances?  SUB says not, but I will 
argue in this paper that we should say that SUB is mistaken, even when this 
specification about kinds and parameters is taken as read. 
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Despite this appearance, and despite the almost universal treatment of chance as a 
measure only over possibilities (whether possible worlds, possible events or possible 
states), there is a paradox about objective chance that is best resolved by allowing 
necessarily equivalent propositions to vary with respect to chance.  Or so I will argue: 
avoiding this result would also come with serious revisions to received wisdom about 
objective chances. 
Principal Principles Go Both Ways 
 
To set up this paradox, we need to invoke the Principal Principle, or one of its 
variants.  David Lewis’s original Principal Principle is a claim about the connection 
between rational prior probabilities and objective chances.  He assumes that chances 
are relative to both times and worlds (according to Lewis chances are contingent, and 
evolve over time, with propositions about earlier times no longer being chancy at later 
ones).  The very general idea is that certainty of the chances at a time is as good a 
guide as we can have to outcomes of events, at least when our only other information 
is about events up to that time and the general principles about chance (e.g. the 
probabilistic laws of nature).  Lewis's preferred way of stating his Principal Principle 
is in terms of initial credence functions: those ideal credence functions that (perhaps 
per impossibile) ideally rational creatures would have before any information received 
through "updating": for example, before any information from the senses.  These 
initial credence functions build in conditional credences, which specify, in effect, 
what credence the individual would come to have were she to update by 
conditionalisation (by becoming certain of various things as "evidence").  Lewis's first 
formulation of an unmodified Principal Principle is (Lewis 1983 p 87): 
 
C(A/XE)=x 
 
Where C is an initial credence function, A is any proposition, X is the proposition that 
the objective chance of A is a number x, and E is any "admissible" proposition (e.g. 
one about the past or the laws of nature). This says that in an initial credence function, 
the conditional credence of a proposition A on the proposition that A has chance of x, 
together with as much or as little allowable information you like, will be x. A way of 
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expressing a similar idea is to put it in terms of unconditional (posterior) credences to 
have: being told (for certain) that the objective chance of A is X is enough to ensure a 
rational person has a credence of X in A, almost regardless of any other information 
she might have. Information about chance has an overriding role in determining 
rational belief, according to Lewis.  
 
A "reformulation" Lewis offers of the Principal Principle suggests that the best 
inquirers can do with perfect information about the past and the "theory of chance" is 
to set their credences in propositions as equal to the chances of those propositions (p 
97):  
 
Chtw (A) = C(A/HwtTw)1 
 
That is, the conditional credence a perfectly rational agent has on a proposition A, 
given full information about the history of a world up to time t together with the 
"theory of chance" that is true in that world, is equal to the objective chance of A at t, 
in w.  (Lewis derives this formulation from his original formulation on pp 96-97, 
though some of the steps in the derivation require substantial assumptions.)  This 
reformulation also provides a recipe to derive objective chances from ideal credences:  
in principle, if you know enough about what conditional credences ideally rational 
agents have in various contingent propositions, given facts about the history and 
principles like the laws of nature, you know enough to tell what the objective chances 
are. 
 
This reformulation is in terms of conditional credences of certain kinds of ideal 
agents, and Lewis has reasons to present things this way rather than in terms of what 
credences agents would have were they to become certain of the story about the 
history and laws of an event (and they were to lack other kinds of information, such as 
direct information about whether A is true, for example).  See Meacham 2010 for a 
clear presentation of why Lewis preferred this way of formulating a chance-credence 
link. However, Lewis's principle about initial credence functions has the following 
                                                            
1 I have replaced Lewis's "P" as the symbol used to represent the objective chance function with "Ch". 
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consequence: if an ideal reasoner with such an initial credence function updates by 
conditionalisation on the conjunction of Htw and Tw, and learns nothing else, her 
credence in A will be equal to the objective chance of A at t. It will be convenient to 
talk about what credence an ideal reasoner would have when she learns Htw and Tw 
with certainty, and the link between that an objective chance, so I will often put things 
that way below, though a scrupulous reader who instead wishes to consider initial 
conditional credences such a reasoner might have should be able to recast the cases 
below in that light, mutatis mutandis. 
 
There is a significant literature on proposals to tweak principles to do roughly the 
same job for which Lewis proposed his Principal Principle.  Famously, Lewis himself 
thought it needed to be modified to go better with his Humean theories of law and 
chances in Lewis 1994. I do not want to rely on any peculiarities of Lewis’s account, 
however, and alternatives to his Principal Principle will serve my purposes just as 
well.  The idea which is the common core of the family of principles can be put in one 
of two ways:  either chance is very close to the credence that an ideal, suitably 
informed, inquirer would have if she was certain of specific information and had no 
extra, "inadmissible" information; or chance is close to the conditional credence an 
ideal inquirer would have, as a prior probability, conditional on the relevant 
information. At least when the chance and credence concern events in worlds like 
ours, now and hereabouts, and given the kinds of chances that are likely to be found in 
a world like ours. Those familiar with the range of variant proposals about the link 
between credence and chance should be able to reconstruct the cases I will present in 
those frameworks: and I would risk confusing those unfamiliar with the variety of 
alternatives if I were to complicate my discussion to be compatible with them all.2 
 
                                                            
2 One dimension of variation that is becoming more popular is to allow that some objective chance 
functions are not temporally asymmetric in the way suggested in the text, and that there is no 
particular privilege that we should give to the history of a chance event rather than the chance of it 
given other sorts of information. (See Handfield 2012 and the papers in Wilson 2014 for recent 
discussions, and for references to the literature on time-symmetry.)  So the reader may wish to see 
cases of ideal reasoners with information about the history and theory of chance as a special case of 
how the credences, and conditional credences, of ideal reasoners should interact with objective 
chance. Seeing the cases discussed as special cases should not matter for their cogency, though, and 
even more examples of the kind of problem I have in mind can be constructed if we have objective 
chance functions that are not time-asymmetric in the way that Lewis assumes they are. 
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For our purposes, we can think of an ideal scientist armed with all the information 
about the laws of nature, and all the information about the past, and ask what credence 
she would have in a future outcome:  that a given atom decays, or that it rains 
tomorrow, for example.  I will help myself to the "reformulation" of the original 
Principal Principle below (Chtw (A) = C(A/HwtTw)), labelling it "PP" for convenience.  
To remind the reader that alternatives to Lewis's Principal Principle will deliver 
slightly different conditional and unconditional probability verdicts, I will often signal 
that the application of the PP delivers a verdict on credence and chance that is at least 
close to correct in the circumstances to be discussed:  all the leading rival principles to 
Lewis's original account give similar probabilistic verdicts in the cases below. 
 
Notice the reformulated PP gives you two guides:  not only a guide to what initial 
credences to ideally have, in terms of the chances, but also a guide to what the 
chances are, in terms of what ideal investigators would have their credences (or 
conditional credences) set to.  The value of a PP is both that it explains why 
information about chances could be useful as a guide to what to believe about whether 
chancy outcomes will occur, and as a guide to what quantity in the world could turn 
out to be the objective chances of outcomes. 
The Paradox for SUB 
 
With the PP in place, some of the cases that cause puzzles for rational credences over 
possibilities will also cause puzzles for objective chance.  I will label the first puzzle 
Actuality.  Consider an everyday chancy proposition: e.g. that it will rain in Berlin 
sometime on June 3rd 2025.  Let us suppose this has an objective chance, at noon on 
June 2nd 2025, of 0.8.  Our hypothetical ideal scientist, given all the information 
about the laws of nature and the past up until noon on June 2nd 2025, but no other 
information, would have a credence of (close to) 0.8 that it rains sometime on June 
3rd.  Alternatively, conditional on that body of information, our hypothetical ideal 
scientist at the (hypothetical, ideal) start of inquiry would have a conditional credence 
of (close to) 0.8 of rain on June 3rd. 
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Now consider the proposition that actually, it will rain sometime on June 3rd 2025 in 
Berlin.  (I mean to be using "actually" in the sense familiar from modal logic:  that 
actually p is true in all possible worlds when p is true at the actual world.  This may or 
may not correspond to any non-jargon use of the expression "actually".)  Since our 
idealised scientist can be assumed to know how "actually" works, it looks like she has 
just as good information about whether it will actually rain as she has about whether it 
will rain.  On the face of it, the best credence to have in whether it will actually rain, 
given all the information about the past and the laws on June 2nd, will also be (close 
to) 0.8.  And likewise, the best conditional credence for our ideal starting scientist, on 
the relevant proposition about the past and the laws as of June 2nd, will be (close to) 
0.8. 
 
But given the rule for the application of "actually", the proposition that actually it 
rains on June 3rd is either necessarily true or necessarily false.  So it is either 
necessarily equivalent to a logical tautology or a logical contradiction.  Let us suppose 
that it does rain on June 3rd, so that "actually, it rains on June 3rd 2025 in Berlin" is 
true, and so necessarily equivalent to the proposition that either it rains on June 3rd 
2025 in Berlin or it does not.  The probability calculus ensures that the triviality that it 
will rain or it will not gets chance 1.  So now we face a challenge for SUB:  by 
applying the principal principle in the way I suggested, one proposition has chance 
0.8, while another, necessarily equivalent to it, has chance 1. 
 
The technique used for "actually, it rains in Berlin sometime on June 3rd" can be 
easily generalised: indeed, if there were two true propositions at all with different 
chances, there would be necessary propositions with different chances on the above 
assumptions, since the actualised variants of those two truths would both be necessary 
and would have different chances by a variation of the above argument.  This is the 
first version of the kind of paradox I want to resolve here. 
 
Some will suspect there is something specifically peculiar about the 'actually' 
operator, as usually understood in discussions of modal logic, which is responsible for 
this problem.  After all, one might doubt that there can be an operator "actually" that 
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functions in the way needed; or one might bite the bullet and insist that, counter-
intuitively, the credence we should have in p and the actualised variant of p often 
varies dramatically; or one might suspect a formal trick even if one cannot quite put 
one's finger on where it is.  So I will present a different, and hopefully even more 
intuitively compelling argument to the conclusion that something should give when 
we combine the Principle Principal (or one of its cousins) with SUB:  and I will argue 
that the most tempting way to resolve the tension is the abandonment of SUB.  Let us 
call the next case to be discussed Charlie. 
 
Charlie 
Suppose I have 1000 atoms of 17N:  an isotope with a half-life of a little less than five 
seconds.  Give the next atom of this batch to decay the name "Charlie".  Suppose, for 
simplicity, somethings which may in fact be true: that the internal structure of the 
atoms is relevantly the same and there are not unknown quantities which give some of 
the atoms a higher chance of decay than others, and that half-lives express genuine 
objective chances and not just our ignorance.  Now consider two questions: 
 
What is the chance of Charlie decaying in the next five seconds? 
 
What credence should an ideally rational agent have that Charlie will decay in the 
next five seconds, conditional on complete information about the laws and the 
history? 
 
I think the answers to these two questions diverge greatly.  The chance that Charlie 
will decay in the next five seconds is a little over .5:  after all, the atoms each have an 
objective chance of a bit over .5 of decaying in the next five seconds.  However, I 
think the credence we should assign to the claim that Charlie will decay in the next 
five seconds is very high:  something in the vicinity of 1 - (0.5)1000.  The conditional 
credence given the laws and the history should be roughly our credence that at least 
one of the atoms will decay in the next five seconds, given the way “Charlie” was 
introduced.  Cht(A) diverges greatly from C(A/ HtwTw).  
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We might add something else to the story to make it clearer that our idealised 
theoriser can entertain the relevant hypothesis about Charlie's decay.  Let us suppose 
that an experimenter is about to start an experiment monitoring 1000 atoms of 17N, 
each with a half-life of just under five seconds. The experimenter has already labelled 
them a1, a2, ... a1000.  Let the dubbing of Charlie be one of the events that happens 
shortly before the relevant 5 seconds, for example in the laboratory.  Then the 
occurrence of the dubbing will be part of the information about the history that our 
idealised inquirer will either be certain of, or be able to have a conditional credence 
on the basis of. 
 
If you wish, we could introduce other stipulations associated with the introduction of 
the name “Charlie” to deal with the possibility of exact ties of decaying and the 
(remote) possibility that none of the atoms ever decay.  We could introduce the name 
“Charlie” to name “the next atom of this batch to decay, if there is a unique one, and 
Jupiter otherwise” – or if you are hung up on trying to work out Jupiter’s chance of 
decay, you may of course select an entity other than Jupiter. 
 
We can then contrast two propositions which apparently should get quite different 
credences.  Suppose a17 is in fact the unique next atom to decay in the set-up, and the 
experimenter dubs "Charlie" just before the start of the observation.  Then we have 
two claims: 
 
(1) a17 will decay in the next five seconds. 
(2) Charlie will decay in the next five seconds. 
 
(1) and (2) are apparently necessarily equivalent, in as strong a sense of necessity as 
you like. (I am assuming that names are rigid designators and something like the 
necessity of identity is true, or at least that any counterexamples to it are irrelevant 
here.)  Given the PP, (1) receives a chance of (about) 0.5 and (2) receives a chance 
very close to 1 (greater at any rate than 0.99).  It seems that again we should not insist 
that necessarily equivalent propositions receive the same objective chance, and so 
reject SUB. 
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Alternative Diagnoses 
 
We could block this argument, as before, by rejecting the PP, though if we chose to 
take this route in order to preserve SUB, we would also need to reject many of the 
rivals in the literature to Lewis's Principal Principle as well as the letter of the 
Principal Principle. 
 
What other alternatives do we have available, should we wish to keep both SUB and a 
PP-like principle?  One option would be to reject the commitments about the name 
"Charlie" needed to get the problem going.  We could, for example, abandon any 
theory of names that lets us conclude that (1) and (2) are necessarily equivalent.  Or 
we could deny that "Charlie" is a name at all in the above example: though I cannot 
see why conferrals of names cannot occur in this way.  Some philosophers I have 
talked to wonder whether "Charlie" even refers before the next atom decays, on the 
grounds that indeterminacy in the future infects dubbings like this: if so, you could 
recast this as a discussion of what the chances were of (1) and (2), seen from a 
vantage point well after a17 decayed. 
 
Another kind of option would be to say that in employing an actuality operator, or in 
introducing the name Charlie in the way that we have, we have introduced 
“inadmissible information” in the sense introduced by Lewis, and so we cannot use 
the conditional credences of our ideal scientist who is aware of that information to 
determine the relevant objective chance.  I have not seen anyone develop an account 
of how introducing an actuality operator into our language gives us inadmissible 
information, but Schwarz 2014 p 90 suggests about a move like the introduction of 
“Charlie” above that it introduces an “inadmissible identifier”:  conditional credences 
about when Charlie decays are, in effect, not just credences that some particular atom 
will decay in the next five seconds, but on a proposition that an atom, being the next 
one to decay, will decay in the next five seconds. John Hawthorne and Maria 
Lasonen-Aarnio 2009 also talk about a case like Charlie and diagnose it as involving 
knowledge of contingent a priori truths, and suggest that the truth of connected “belief 
episodes” is “inadmissibly connected to the future”: though they have little to say 
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about knowing what we ordinarily know when we witness this sort of dubbing would 
yield inadmissible information. 
 
The thought is that the introduction of “Charlie” is something like finding out, in 
advance, which atom will be the next to decay.  If, for example, a time-traveller 
returned from the future with that information to add to an ideal scientist’s opinions 
that would enable the ideal scientist to do better in forming her credences about decay 
than just conforming her credences to the objective chances:  but this is no threat to 
the Principal Principle, because Principal Principles only tie the objective chances to 
idealised credence, or conditional credence, of informed inquirers who have all 
admissible information but lack "inadmissible" information.  After all, whatever you 
know about the chances of a chancy coin flip, if you also knew with complete 
certainty that the coin land heads on this trial your credence in heads should be 1, not 
whatever the chance of heads is. 
 
As far as I can see, though, the introduction of the name “Charlie” does not give our 
ideal scientist any information, in any direct way at least, other than information about 
the past and the laws.  Consider a situation where Wayne the experimenter utters the 
words “I hereby dub the next atom in the experimental setup to decay ‘Charlie’”.  He 
makes some noises, and some mental activity goes on:  referential intention forming, 
for example.  Our ideal scientist should be able to learn that these things went on with 
Wayne near the apparatus just before the start of the observations.  What people say 
near apparatuses looks about as ordinary a thing to learn as I can think of.  It has all 
the usual marks of admissible information—it is just information about relatively 
ordinary, contingent goings-on in the past, and is the sort that we might expect 
ordinary inquirers to possess.  Likewise, when we have a conditional credence on 
Charlie being the next one to decay plus other facts about the past, including Wayne's 
dubbing, the fact about the dubbing is just one more ordinary proposition about the 
past leading up to the experiment to conditionalise on.  While the option to radically 
revise what sorts of facts are admissible is available, there does not yet seem to be a 
very satisfying philosophical explanation of why things we learn from observing such 
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dubbings should count as inadmissible in the way that facts about the future of the 
chance episode might.  
 
Yet another option would be to decide that chances are not features of propositions at 
all, but rather something else.  There are several versions of this strategy: for example, 
we could insist that objective chances are features of sets of possible worlds directly, 
whether or not those are suitable contents of belief: then necessarily equivalent 
objects of chance would be identical, leaving, apparently, no room for a puzzle about 
assigning different chances to necessarily equivalent objects of chance. Or we could 
do an equivalent move in the vocabulary of assigning objective chances to events, 
treating necessarily co-occurring events as identical. If we went either of these routes, 
a Principal Principle will no longer give us a direct road from ideal credence to 
chance:  given the ideal credences, there will be a further question about what chances 
are had by sets of worlds or events. 
 
If we deny that chances are features of propositions, then it will be much trickier to 
say what sort of Principal Principle we should endorse: or indeed what information 
about chances should do to our degrees of belief, given that our beliefs and credences, 
at least, concern propositions.3  However, many ways of pursuing this strategy will 
have the same effect as my proposed solution:  if we associate chances with 
something other than propositions, the kind of problem I have raised here will 
strongly suggest that when it comes to specifying the link between credences and 
chances, necessarily equivalent propositions will not always be treated the same as 
each other by whatever principle links chances and rational degrees of belief in 
propositions.   
 
Another option would be to assign chances to epistemically individuated propositions, 
such as David Chalmers's "sets of epistemically possible scenarios" associated with 
                                                            
3 Salmon, manuscript, in response to cases he developed independently with similar structures to 
Actuality and Charlie, and proposes that chances of propositions are relative to propositional guises.  
He denies SUB, allowing disparate objective chances to obtain of the same proposition.  If I have 
understood his view, he would also say credences in propositions are also relative to propositional 
guises, thus treating chances and credences as involving the same objects of probability, in both 
cases relative to propositional guises. 
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sentences (see Chalmers 2011).  Chalmers argues that credences should attach to 
these sets of epistemic scenarios, and plausibly, "it rains tomorrow" and "actually it 
rains tomorrow" are epistemically equivalent.  At least for those aware of how 
"Charlie" is introduced, "Charlie decays in the next five minutes" and "the next atom 
to decay in the experimental setup" are also plausibly epistemically equivalent (or 
near enough).  Whatever the merits of treating sets of epistemic scenarios as the 
objects of credence, however, it would be odd to treat them as the objects of objective 
chance unless we were idealists about 'objective' chance:  at the very least we would 
be owed a story about why objective chances such as those embodied in atomic half-
lives have anything very much to do with what idealised versions of us can 
distinguish a priori.  It is also not clear whether to interpret this suggestion as 
accepting or rejecting SUB, since sentences with different modal profiles are 
supposed to be associated with the same sets of epistemic scenarios:  on one very 
natural way of interpreting the proposal that chances are assigned to these sets, it is a 
way of modelling necessarily equivalent sentences diverging in their chances, and so 
is a way of implementing the failure of SUB for the entities that are most naturally 
ascribed features such as necessary equivalence (i.e. Chalmers's "secondary 
intensions"). 
How Best to Proceed Without SUB? 
 
Even if we do as I suggest and reject SUB, the current situation can still seem 
unsatisfactory.  After all, we have an argument that (1) should receive a chance of 
about 0.5 and (2) should receive a chance near 1 (<0.99).  But it may seem strange to 
think that Charlie/a17/whatever we call it should have such different chances of 
decay—can we even talk of objects having chances of decay at all in this scenario? 
 
The most satisfying way to resolve this uneasiness, I think, is to restrict the PP.4  If 
only some propositions have chances, it would make sense to restrict the PP to a 
                                                            
4  Even in Lewis's original presentation, he does not insist that the Principal Principle applies to all 
propositions, though the exceptions he envisages are quite different from the ones discussed here 
(Lewis 1986 p 132).  Since Lewis identifies necessarily equivalent propositions with each other, he will 
not be able to have cases where necessarily equivalent propositions vary with respect to whether they 
have chances.  Despite Schwarz's different diagnosis of what is wrong with cases like Charlie, his 
positive proposal about the Principal Principle ends up being related in some ways to the one I propose 
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chance/credence link for the propositions that have chances at all.  Once we do this, 
we have the option of denying that both (1) and (2) have chances:  and indeed once 
we do this, it is natural to think that (2) is not the sort of proposition we need to assign 
a chance to in the first place. (To lack a chance altogether is different from having a 
chance of 0:  0 is a perfectly respectable value for a chance to have, while 
propositions that lack chances (if there are any) would not even have chance 0.)  
Propositions like (1) are the sort that we naturally infer chance propositions from, 
given the theory of radioactive decay, not (2).  To be sure, we naturally apply chances 
to some propositions that are superficially like (2), such as the proposition that "some 
atom in the sample will decay in the next five seconds".  But that proposition is not 
equivalent to the proposition that Charlie will decay in the next five seconds: the 
proposition that some atom in the sample decays in the next five seconds is true in 
many states where Charlie takes longer to decay than it actually does, and is beaten by 
some other atom.   
 
Notice that if we allow (1) has a chance of 0.5 but (2) lacks a chance altogether, we 
would still have to reject the principle that necessarily equivalent propositions have 
the same chance.  The pair of (1) and (2) would still be a perfectly good 
counterexample to SUB.  Allowing that some troublesome propositions lack chances 
altogether, however, would let us, if we wished, adopt a more restricted form of SUB:  
we could continue to maintain that any pair of necessarily equivalent propositions 
which have chances at all share the same chance.  The problems for SUB raised in 
this paper do not cause trouble for this more restricted form of SUB. 
 
Restricting the PP to only some propositions also allows for some other options.  We 
could allow, for example, that some propositions that did not obey the PP nevertheless 
had chances, for example.  A theory that did so could assign (1) and (2) the same 
chance (presumably 0.5).  I think it is more appealing to say that the PP (or whichever 
relative we adopt) applies to all propositions with chances:  we lose some of our grip 
on chance itself if information about chances sometimes constrains credence in a PP-
like way and sometimes does not.  So I do not recommend assigning (2) a chance 
                                                                                                                                                                          
here, restricting it only to certain of the properties we might hypothesise that objects possess. (Schwarz 
2014 pp 90-92 
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despite holding that PP-like principles do not apply to it.  Still, I think it is interesting 
to notice that restricting the PP leaves some questions about chance unsettled without 
some further principle, such as requiring that all propositions with chances at all 
conform to the PP (or whichever relative we endorse).5 
 
Taking the option that (2) lacks a chance altogether does leave us with one puzzle.  
Consider the atom Charlie (or a17, or by any other name).  We might want to ask what 
chance it has of decaying, nevermind what it is called.   Chances seem de re, 
especially for those who think that single-case chance is in entirely good order.  But if 
(1) and (2) receive different chances (or one receives a chance and the other does not), 
we may need to be more careful.  And the puzzle does not stop here.  It seems very 
natural to talk about an object or an event in a number of different ways and feel 
entitled to retain chance ascriptions:  if a17 is Ludwig's favourite atom, and a17 has a 
0.5 chance of decaying in the next 5 seconds, then Ludwig's favourite atom has a 0.5 
chance of decaying in the next five seconds (and so we had better be ready for 
Ludwig's disappointment).  Or if a17 is the only atom in partition 20 of our apparatus, 
and a17 has a 0.5 chance of decaying in the next 5 seconds, then the only atom in 
partition 20 of our apparatus has a 0.5 chance of decaying in the next five seconds.  
Both the inference about Ludwig's favourite atom and the atom in partition 20 seem 
entirely fine—deductively valid even!—but it is hard to see how they could be good 
inferences if atoms do not have chances of decay simpliciter. 
 
We would have a solution to this problem that would be somewhat satisfactory if, for 
each object and property it might have, there is at most one chance function that 
assigns a chance to a proposition saying that object has that property. When there is a 
proposition like this for an object and a property that receives a chance C, then, we 
could allow ourselves to make attributions of C to that object having that property 
however we picked out the object (or the property).  We could then help ourselves to 
locutions like "Ludwig's favourite atom has a 0.5 chance of decay in the next five 
seconds", even if the proposition assigned a chance designates that atom in some 
                                                            
5 My current suspicion is that there are reasons to reject even the restricted principle that any two 
necessarily equivalent propositions that have objective chances have the same objective chance:  
but these reasons are quite different from any touched on here. 
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other way, and does not mention Ludwig or his preferences at all.  If this solution was 
pursued, we would need to be careful not to confuse these de re attributions with 
chances of propositions: if it turned out that a17 had a 0.5 chance of decaying, and so 
we could correctly say that Charlie did, it would still not do to hold that the 
proposition that Charlie decays in the next 5 seconds received a 0.5 chance, on pain of 
abandoning the proposed solution to the main puzzle posed in this paper.  Still, this 
suggestion would recover some of the de re behaviour of chance ascriptions, at least 
provided objects rarely or never were ascribed a given property by different 
propositions which each received a chance relative to a particular chance function 
(and set of parameters). 
 
Conclusions 
 
The solution I have recommended to the problems raised in this paper is that only 
some propositions get objective chances, for any given objective chance function.  
Furthermore, these propositions are not just strange propositions that we cannot easily 
express:  they include ones we can easily evaluate and act upon.  (We could bet 
whether it will actually rain on a given date, or when exactly Charlie will decay.)  
This is potentially trouble for decision theories that assume outcomes always have 
well-defined chances. 
 
There are other motives for being even more radical than I have done in this paper and 
insisting that, for example, distinct metaphysical impossibilities get distinct non-zero 
chances. (This is how Nathan Salmon reacts to the kinds of cases I have discussed in 
Salmon, manuscript.)  Some notions of probability used in mathematics seem to have 
this feature:  the probability that a given number is prime can be non-zero even when, 
in fact, it is composite, if we take with full seriousness the talk of “probability” used 
in some statements of the prime number theorem, for example.  And there are a 
number of other applications of the thought that impossibilities may have non-zero 
objective probabilities, though a discussion of these should be left for another 
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occasion.6  If a more radical approach to objective probabilities and impossibility is 
required, the conclusions of this paper may need to be revisited:  though at present I 
think the preferred diagnosis of this paper for the particular cases discussed will 
survive consideration of more exotic cases that may require different treatments.  
 
Finally, the case of objective chance is one more argument for a more general 
metaphysical contention I have been defending:  that hyperintensional theoretical 
resources, that is, theoretical resources which distinguish necessary equivalents, are 
needed for adequate theories of the non-representational world and not merely of our 
representations.  That is, as well as needing to recognise hyperintensionality to 
account for belief, meaning, fiction, and so on, we need resources to theorise about 
metaphysical topics that are not matters of representation:  in some good sense, there 
is hyperintensionality in the non-representational world (Nolan 2014).  If objective 
chance ascriptions are hyperintensional:  if, that is, substituting necessarily equivalent 
propositions into operators attributing objective chance can change truth-value of 
claims, then we have another case where hyperintensional notions are needed beyond 
our theory of representation.  If objective chance is in the world and not merely in our 
representations of it, then so is at least one worldly hyperintensional phenomenon, and 
not merely representational one.  
 
One topic for future work, if this proposal is on the right track, is to determine which 
propositions get genuine objective chances and which do not.  It would be good to 
                                                            
6 Let me mention two other potential applications for non-zero probabilities of metaphysical 
impossibilities in metaphysical theorising.  One is to allow that there is a non-zero physical chance 
of metaphysically impossible autoinfanticide in time-travel cases, as in the view defended in 
Horacek 2005. A recent development of that line of thought is in Effingham, in preparation.  
Another would be as a way of reconciling macroscopic indeterminism with microscopic 
indeterminism: when an event E receives a macroscopic chance at a time of, for example, 0.5, even 
though E is incompatible with the past and the microscopic laws, it may be convenient for the 
relevant macroscopic chance function to give, at that time, a non-zero chance to the conjunction of 
(i) a proposition completely specifying a time in the past of E, (ii) a specification of the microscopic 
laws, and (iii) the claim that E occurs.  (The idea is that the macroscopic principles encoded in the 
chances leave E open, and do so even when past microscopic principles are specified.)  This option 
would fit the spirit of Glynn 2010's treatment of macroscopic chance, though I do not think Glynn 
himself is committed to it in that paper.  Other treatments of macroscopic chance such as List and 
Pivato 2015 require that macroscopic chance functions are defined over different algebras of 
propositions than microscopic chance functions when macroscopic chance co-exists with 
microscopic determinism, and so would avoid ascribing non-zero macroscopic chances to 
impossibilities. 
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have something principled to say about what the problematic propositions in Actuality 
and Charlie have in common in virtue of which they lack chances.  I can see two 
broad strategies for pursuing this project.  One would be a “top-down” one, where we 
begin with the assumption that all propositions are fit to get chances and then come up 
with “monster barring” principles to rule out apparently troublesome ones.  Another, 
which seems more promising, would be a “bottom up” process by which we identify 
some propositions deserving of objective chance, and then articulate principles that 
take us from the chances of those propositions to chances of others in ways that do not 
lead to trouble.  For example, we might begin with propositions about events that are 
explicitly attributed chances in our best physical theory, then extend chances to 
boolean combinations and other logical combinations of these, and look for other 
principled ways to extend chance attributions further in such a way that (among other 
things) do not lead to ascribing conflicting objective chances to necessarily equivalent 
propositions, at least not in the sort of cases pointed out above.   
 
Of these two strategies, I would prefer the latter:  it would not only provide more 
security that there are not more problems awaiting discovery, but it would give us 
insight into why the various propositions with objective chances have the chances that 
they do.  But the details of such a construction are for another time.7 
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